

RETURN

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To an Address to His Excellency the Governor General, dated the 22nd February, 1909, calling for a copy of Orders in Council, correspondence, letters, despatches, memoranda and communications, between the Imperial and Canadian Governments relating to the organization of an Imperial General Staff.

CHAS. MURPHY,
Secretary of State.

COPIES OF ORDERS IN COUNCIL, CORRESPONDENCE, &c., BETWEEN
THE IMPERIAL AND CANADIAN GOVERNMENTS, RELATING TO
THE ORGANIZATION OF AN IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

COLONIAL CONFERENCE, 1907

RESOLUTIONS.

The following Resolutions were unanimously agreed to by the Conference, except where otherwise stated:—

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III.

GENERAL STAFF FOR THE SERVICE OF THE EMPIRE.

That this Conference welcomes and cordially approves the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War, and, without wishing to commit any of the Governments represented, recognizes and affirms the need of developing for the service of the Empire a General Staff, selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole, which shall study military science in all its branches, shall collect and disseminate to the various Governments military information and intelligence, shall undertake the preparation of schemes of defence on a common principle, and, without in the least interfering in questions connected with command and administration, shall, at the request of the respective Governments, advise as to the training, education, and war organization of the military forces of the Crown in every part of the Empire.

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IV.

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MILITARY DEFENCE.

See Sessional Paper No. 58, 1908, pages 94 to 128.

WAR OFFICE, LONDON, S.W. December 15, 1908.

The Under Secretary of State,
Colonial Office, London, S.W.

SIR,—In continuation of previous correspondence, and in pursuance of the Resolutions passed at the Imperial Conference held last year with reference to the formation of an Imperial General Staff, and approving the general principles for the military defence of the Empire submitted to the Conference by the Secretary of State for War I am commanded by the Army Council to forward for the information of the Earl of Crewe the inclosed statement of their views on the subject of the Imperial General Staff, and to request that—should His Lordship think it advisable—this statement may be submitted to the Ministers of the respective self-governing Dominions.

The inclosed paper is based on the general principles embodied in the statement made by the Secretary of State for War, which received the cordial approval of the Conference.

The main points in this statement, so far as the subject now under discussion is concerned, may be summarized as follows:—

- (1.) The necessity for the maintenance of sea supremacy, which alone can ensure any military co-operation at all.
- (2.) The desirability of a certain broad plan of military organization for the Empire, but not a rigid model making no allowance for local difficulties.
- (3.) A conception of combination in which the armed forces of the Empire would be organized in two parts; the first part having local defence as its function, the second designed for the service of the Empire as a whole.

The Army Council are well aware that the self-governing Dominions can give no guarantee that contingents of any given strength or composition will be forthcoming for service in any part of the Empire in the event of a great war. At the same time, they fully realize that the feelings of loyalty and affection towards the Mother Country entertained by the Oversea Dominions will operate as powerfully in the hour of trial, as they did during the recent war in South Africa. But the lack of definite and timely provision for an emergency deprives military forces of much of their potential value, while adequate preparation has been proved in all recent campaigns to be a paramount factor in securing a rapid and successful decision. For these reasons, although the Oversea Dominions may be unable to undertake definite responsibility for anything beyond local defence, it would still be well, in organizing for such defence, to consider the necessities incidental to a situation in which the Dominions beyond the seas desired to give effective military service in association with the troops of the Mother Country. Such a contingency has been kept in view in the accompanying paper.

In conclusion the Army Council desire to urge the importance of carrying into effect the general principles of the higher organization of units agreed to by the Conference of 1907.

E. W. D. WARD.

THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

The need for a General Staff, 'selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole' was affirmed by the Imperial Conference which met in London in April, 1907, and the duties to be performed by such a staff, in time of peace, were defined as follows:—

'To study military science in all its branches; to collect and disseminate to the various governments military information and intelligence; to undertake the preparation of schemes of defence on a common principle, and (without in the least interfering in questions connected with command and administration) at the request of the respective governments, to advise as to the training, education and war organization of the military forces of the Crown in every part of the Empire.'

It was further decided that the Chief of the General Staff should put forward definite proposals to give effect to the resolutions of the Conference on the subject. The object of this paper is to do so.

Before definite proposals can be put forward, however, it is necessary to examine into certain general considerations on which the arrangements made should be based.

In the first place it must be recognized that we are now practically only at the beginning of the creation of military forces, on an important scale, in the oversea Dominions. The Empire has now reached a stage when its sons in the oversea Dominions have begun to feel themselves sufficiently strong to undertake more responsibility for the defence of their own homes, and to look on this not only as a duty which they are willing to perform, but as a right. The real problem before the various governments concerned is to guide this feeling into correct channels from the outset. It is in order to supply such guidance that the creation of an Imperial General Staff is necessary.

Considering the subject from this standpoint it appears that we should—

- (i.) Form a clear conception of the general principles on which our system for national defence should be built up and perfected, and of the relations of the several parts of the whole.
- (ii.) Outline the most suitable and efficient organization for an Imperial General Staff to develop and perfect that system.
- (iii.) Taking this organization as our objective, consider the best means of selecting and training the officers who are to compose it.
- (iv.) Consider what means are at present available and how they can best and soonest be utilized for the formation of the Imperial General Staff.

In this paper, accordingly, the subject is discussed under the above headings, and endeavour is made to present (under each heading) an ideal to be kept in view, and to suggest the best method of approaching that ideal with our existing means.

PART I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AFFECTING NATIONAL DEFENCE.

Considerable anxiety is at the present time being displayed throughout the Empire with regard to questions of local and Imperial defence, and nowhere is the desire to consider such problems more remarkable than in our great self-governing Dominions. Not only at home, but in these Dominions and in India, steps are being taken to develop local military resources with a view to organizing for local defence on a more solid and practical foundation, and there can be little doubt that the not far distant future will witness a great development in the potential military resources of the Empire.

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It would be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss at length the causes which have led up to this movement.

Whatever these causes may be it is certain that, with the development of the great self-governing Dominions, a growing desire is also evident in them for self-contained, efficient, and progressive military institutions; while, with the growth of Imperial ideals, the need is being felt for knitting closer together the military forces of the Empire. These facts must be kept constantly in view in everything that is undertaken now, in order that progress may be made along right lines from the beginning.

National defence in the case of the British Empire divides itself naturally into—

(i.) Local defence.

(ii.) Imperial defence.

As regards local defence in each case the object is to be kept in view, which should govern the standard to be striven for, is to provide, organize, and render efficient such means of defence as will form by their existence a serious deterrent to the most probable and feasible form of attack. In other words, these means should be adequate to enable each particular division of the Empire to secure itself against reasonable initial contingencies; while, in the event of more serious hostile undertakings, the organization and means provided should be sufficient to enable the issue to be deferred until the naval and military resources of the Empire can be concentrated at the decisive point or points.

Turning to Imperial defence, the first point to note is that it is a cardinal military maxim that no organization for defence can be regarded as adequate or complete which does not contemplate offensive action. Passive defence seldom, if ever, wins decisive results. As already stated, the possible necessity for the concentration of Imperial forces for that defence of the Empire was admitted by the Imperial Conference. The scale on which such forces might have to be concentrated must depend on the Imperial interests involved, the probability being that they would be required to come to the assistance of, and act in combination with, forces maintained for local defence in some particular portion of the Empire.

It is thus evident how closely the forces maintained in various portions of the Empire may be associated in war time. In order that the several parts of such an army may be able to act in close combination, they must be organized on the same general principles, especially as regards the system of command and staff duties. The need for this was dealt with fully in a 'Memorandum on the possibility of assimilating war organization throughout the Empire,' which was submitted to the Imperial Conference on the 14th March, 1907, by the Chief of the General Staff. A copy of this Memorandum is attached, to obviate the need of any further discussion on this point.

Again the proverb that 'Unity is strength' applies to war and preparation for war with greater force than to almost any other sphere of human activity. Combination of effort is a fundamental principle of war, and the existence of different schools of thought in an army is fatal to such combination. The ideal to be arrived at is that all divisions of a military force should be capable of acting in war as parts of a whole. The ideal can only be fully realized when all the parts are organized and trained by one brain, and in the modern army that brain is the General Staff. The General Staff must therefore be an entity throughout the Empire, and to make it so, all its members ought to be uniformly trained in principles and practice in one school under one head.

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PART II.

THE MOST SUITABLE AND EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION FOR AN IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

Before attempting to form any estimate of what our requirements would be for an Imperial General Staff, as recommended by the Imperial Conference, or to suggest how the necessary officers to compose it should be trained and selected, it is necessary to consider what its duties would be. In attempting to do this an essential condition to be borne in mind is that the true and only objects to be attained are:—

(i.) Efficient preparation for war in peace time.

(ii.) Successful conduct of war in war time.

No solution of the problem can be effective unless it is governed by these factors.

The duties of the General Staff 'selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole,' as regards *preparation for war*, were defined by the Imperial Conference.

We still have to consider the duties of the General Staff in war. These may be described as follows:—

'Assisting the General Officer or Officers in Local Command by—

'(i.) Planing; thinking; watching the enemy; obtaining compiling, and distributing all information concerning the theatre of war, the enemy's forces, and their disposition.

'(ii.) Working out all arrangements necessary for security, marches, and battle in accordance with the plans of the General.

'(iii.) Communicating the necessary orders at the right time and place.

'(iv.) Watching over the fighting condition of the troops, and keeping the General informed of their efficiency in every respect.'

It follows that, in the first place, we require a central guiding body to consider and draw up plans for the defence of the Empire as a whole, to study and formulate broad principles of general application, and to collect and disseminate general information. In the second place, we require local branches to study local needs and local possibilities, and to supervise the application of broad general principles under local conditions. But, as has already been said, the Imperial General Staff must be an entity; therefore, these local branches must form parts of one whole, springing from the central body.

Thus, both in peace and war, the General Staff must be regarded as a large organization, consisting of a central body, with branches stretching out to all the various units of an army. If it is to carry out the duties allotted to it efficiently and to act as the guiding and directing spirit—the 'brain'—of the whole army, it is evident not only that all its members must be highly educated and trained, but that its work must be carried out on common principles in all parts of the Empire. It is, therefore, a necessity that the Imperial General Staff should have one recognized head to ensure uniformity of method and purpose. That head can only be the Chief of the General Staff in London, who must become the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, if we are to have a really efficient organization.

Under the more or less direct supervision of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the General Staff organization for the Empire should be built up gradually on the following lines:—

I. The central body having its headquarters in London, and working directly under the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

II.—Local sections in the United Kingdom, in each of our regular garrisons abroad, in each self-governing Dominion, and in India. These local sections, except in the case of the smaller foreign garrisons, might be subdivided into the local headquarters, and the staff with the local troops. Each section should have a Chief at its head; and it would deal with questions connected with (1) local defence, and (2) the training of troops on lines similar to those now followed for the United Kingdom by the Training Directorate at the War Office.

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In this organization, as applied to the self-governing Dominions, each chief of a local section of the General Staff would be the adviser of his own government as well as the head of all General Staff Officers in his section whether at his headquarters or with the troops. A possible difficulty to be solved, as regards this organization, is the establishment of the proper relationship between the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Chiefs of local sections of the General Staff in the several Dominions. It has already been pointed out that in all purely military questions guidance should come from the former. But it may be held that such guidance is incompatible with full control of the local Chief by his own government, and this full control must be accepted from the outset. The solution of this difficulty would appear to be that, while the Chiefs of the local sections of the General Staff keep in close communication with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, they cannot receive orders from him. He will keep them informed as to what are considered the correct general principles; and they will advise their governments as to the best methods of applying these principles to local conditions, and as to the risk of departing from them. When their advice is not accepted, it will be their duty to carry out whatever their respective governments may order.

Under such conditions the best method of keeping up close touch between the central body of the General Staff and the local sections of the General Staff requires further consideration. Much can be done to ensure uniformity by a judicious system of preliminary selection, education, and training of officers for the General Staff; by periodical interchanges between those serving on the staff in different parts of the Empire; and by occasional general conferences. These questions are discussed in the following pages, and it will be necessary to rely a good deal on such methods. But in these days the military art is progressive. New ideas and inventions demand constant consideration, and close and frequent personal communication between the centre and the branches is necessary to prevent the initiation and growth of divergent opinion which might be fatal to combination.

This personal touch may be maintained either by delegating selected officers from the central body to each of the local sections, changing them at frequent intervals; or by reversing this process. The first of these methods would be most effective in some ways, but it might not always be acceptable to local authorities. In all probability a combination of both methods would work best on the whole. In the first instance, selected officers of local sections might be attached by their respective governments to the War Office, London, and periodically changed. Their duty would be to study the methods of education and training and staff duties in vogue under the immediate eyes of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, as well as the latest development of ideas on organization, strategy and tactics; to give the Chief of the Imperial General Staff information of local defence arrangements and other local matters in their respective countries; to study the part to be played by local forces in Imperial defence; to correspond on such questions with their local chiefs; and, finally, on relief, to return home to explain and practice personally what they have learnt.

In a great war the General Staff officers with the troops would be furnished chiefly from those serving in the local sections from which the troops were drawn, while those attached to the supreme commander in the field would be mainly drawn from officers who had proved their efficiency on the central body of the Imperial General Staff.

It is abundantly clear that the officers appointed to the General Staff, both in peace and war, should possess the confidence not only of military opinion, but also of the Imperial and other governments of the Empire. This can only be attained by the inclusion of the General Staff of officers having specialist, personal and practical knowledge of the peculiar local conditions, both military and political, in all parts of the Empire.

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PART III.

THE PRINCIPLES OF SELECTION AND TRAINING OF OFFICERS FOR THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

The organization of the Imperial General Staff having been outlined, it is now necessary to consider the general principles on which officers should be selected and trained for it. Under this head the first point to note is that, in order to qualify themselves for employment on the General Staff, officers must have been educated previously up to a certain common standard of military knowledge, and have become imbued with the requisite uniformity of thought and practice.

This uniformity in training and thought can only be obtained by passing officers intended for General Staff work through a staff college.

The Staff College at Camberley, working under the immediate supervision of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, must be recognized for some years to come as the central school of higher military education for the whole Empire. But as our military institutions develop throughout the Empire, this establishment will be unable to meet Imperial requirements outside those parts of the Empire which are garrisoned by the regular army, including India. The essence of efficient training lies in individual attention and instruction. If too great a number of officers are collected together for such training at one centre, any such establishment will become congested, and individual training is certain to suffer. With the growth, therefore, of the General Staff of the Army at large, the need will arrive for decentralization; and if the self-governing dominions beyond the seas are ever to become self-contained in their military institutions, they themselves will, sooner or later, recognize this necessity. Such decentralization should take the form of an educational establishment on similar lines to, and worked in close connection with, the Staff College at Camberley, for each great division of the Empire. It is, however, recognized that this requirement may not make itself sufficiently felt for a considerable period, and pending the institution of more such colleges than exist at present, officers of the forces of the over-sea Dominions should be encouraged to make the fullest possible use of existing establishments.

Working in close touch and uniformity, except as regards entrance examinations, with the Staff College at Camberley, the Staff College at Quetta constitutes already for India a valuable part of our educational machinery.

Thus, without excluding officers of proved ability who are not staff college graduates, it must be accepted as a principle that recruits for the Imperial General Staff should normally pass through one of the staff colleges. Their selection for, and entry at, such an establishment would mark officially the first step in their training.

The standard of military knowledge to be required from officers entering the staff colleges must be made as uniform as possible, and this should be attained by holding simultaneous examinations with precisely the same papers for the different colleges.

Uniformity of instruction at the colleges must also be secured. This can best be done by making the syllabus and curriculum identical for all, and by careful selection of the instructors. At all such colleges the head should be selected from officers who have served on the central body of the Imperial General Staff, and he, with a proportion of the instructors (say, one-third as is now the case at the Quetta college) should be Camberley graduates.

After graduating at a staff college, an officer should return to regimental duty with troops for a time, in order to refresh his knowledge of their wants and feelings in the light of his wider experience. This period should, if possible, be of at least one year's duration.

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After this, officers selected as likely to be suitable for General Staff work should undergo, under the eye of the Chief of the local section of the General Staff, a probationary course of practical staff training with troops and at headquarters, during which they would be fully reported on, with regard to their fitness for the Imperial General Staff. Under present conditions this course of staff training should be carried out under the supervision of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London, or in India under that of the Commander in Chief of the Forces in that country.

After completing the full course of training on the above lines, an officer should ordinarily serve for the further period in his own country with troops. But all officers who have completed the full course, and have been found to possess the necessary qualifications, should be considered as eligible for appointment to the Imperial General Staff when required.

A system of training on the lines described has been inaugurated and is being developed at home, and should, as soon as practicable, be introduced in other parts of the Empire.

The next step in the General Staff officer's career would be appointment to a local section of the General Staff. Ordinarily this should be in his own country in the first instance; but temporary interchange between officers for duty in different parts of the Empire should be arranged by the governments concerned on the advice of the Chiefs of local sections of the General Staff.

It will probably be found advisable that such interchanges should take place under the advice of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Moreover, the system proposed seems scarcely practicable unless the organization of the various branches of the Imperial General Staff in the different parts of the Empire, and the allotment of duties to individuals, follow a general system so far as local conditions admit.

In addition to periodical interchanges as suggested above, great benefit would result from occasional conferences attended by representatives of the Imperial General Staff from all parts of the Empire, for the purpose of comparing notes and discussing military matters under the presidency of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Such conferences would serve to keep the various members of the Staff in touch with one another, and to prevent differences of opinion arising on important matters of principle. The Chiefs of the local sections of the General Staff in various portions of the Empire should also be encouraged to correspond with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff himself, or with his immediate subordinates in London.

Officers composing the central body of the Imperial General Staff must be the pick of the officers of the whole Empire who are qualified for General Staff work. They should be retained in that employment only as long as they prove themselves fitted for it. They should, as far as possible, before appointment to the central body, have served on the local staffs both at home and abroad. They should be nominated on the advice of the Chiefs of the local General Staffs or as regards officers serving in India by the Commander in Chief in India, subject to the concurrence of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

In carrying out the general system outlined above, an ideal to be aimed at is that, eventually, the self-governing Dominions and India should be self-supporting as regards the provision of properly qualified officers for their respective sections of the General Staff, in addition to providing a due proportion of officers for service on the central body of the Imperial General Staff.

On completion of a tour of General Staff work, whether on the central body or on a local section, officers should ordinarily return to duty with troops before reappointment to the staff.

The foregoing is submitted as an outline of the objective at which we should aim. An efficient General Staff organization can only be evolved gradually, and, as already stated, it is necessary to its successful evolution that the end to be attained shall be clear from the very commencement. Only thus can we ensure that progress shall continue steadily and in the right direction.

PART IV.

PRESENT MEANS AND HOW BEST TO UTILIZE THEM FOR THE CREATION OF AN IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

It is first necessary to consider what personnel is actually available, and what means already exist, for training officers for the General Staff, indicating how far this personnel can apparently be made to meet present Imperial requirements. We can then proceed to consider what modifications of system appear desirable.

On looking into this, we find that opportunities for studying and practicing the art of war vary considerably in different portions of the Empire.

As regards its military forces, the British Empire may be considered as consisting of three great divisions, viz.:—

- (i.) The United Kingdom, and the various possessions whose defence and military organization are directly under the authorities at home.
- (ii.) India, which is garrisoned by both British and Indian forces, the control of which is mainly under the Government of India and the India Office, although the War Office retains certain powers of issuing instructions in regard to the British troops in India.
- (iii.) The oversea Dominions, in which military service and organization are altogether regulated by local governments, and which may be subdivided again into the Dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

Considering the Empire as consisting of the three main divisions defined above, we have already in the first of these divisions a professional Army comprising a considerable number of trained and experienced officers, who have been specially educated, in a central school (the Staff College, Camberley), in the higher art of war and in staff duties. A General Staff has been organized, and has gained several years' experience of its work. We have some thousands of regimental officers to choose from, all of whom are educated, up to a certain standard, on a regular system which has been at work for years. We have an organized and experienced machinery for selecting the best of these officers for higher education and training, and the necessary facilities for providing both.

In India the conditions are, in great measure, similar. A large and efficient Army, including a number of experienced and highly-trained officers, is maintained there. Regimental officers are educated on practically the same system as exists at present in the regular army service elsewhere. A Staff College was opened in India in 1905; its curriculum is approximately the same as at Camberley; and it is hoped that, by selecting the Commandant and one-third of the instructional Staff from Camberley graduates, uniformity of instruction will be ensured.

On the other hand, the self-governing oversea Dominions of the Empire present a different problem. At present it is only in Canada that there exists a national educational establishment resembling Woolwich and Sandhurst, in which youths who possess a suitable general education can be grounded in the more technical details of military art, before they enter, as officers, the military service of their country.

It is, however, necessary to inaugurate the Imperial General Staff without any avoidable delay, as it is felt that in cases where the oversea Dominions are contemplating a considerable expansion of their military forces on new principles, the institution of suitable and efficient local sections of the General Staff for purposes of organization and training is very necessary. It is evident that where such a reconstruction of military elements is in process of evolution the benefit of past and practical experience should be made available from the very commencement. It is so important that the military forces of the Empire should not be allowed to develop on divergent

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and independent lines, but on common and approved principles as regards organization and training, that an attempt should be made to start the General Staff organization now with the means available.

A limited number of officers of the oversea Dominions, who are staff college graduates are serving in the United Kingdom or India, or are now being employed under their respective governments. It is also realized that among the permanent or other forces of the oversea Dominions, there will be found some experienced officers of proved ability, who would be available for General Staff employment.

It is not pretended that the officers so selected will be sufficient in number, or that all will be qualified as regards training, practical experience, and seniority to meet General Staff requirements. But in such cases the oversea Dominions would find no difficulty in borrowing from the home and Indian armies the necessary officers to complete and start into being the requisite General Staff organizations. The services of officers borrowed in this manner would be replaced proportionately by those of officers of the forces of the Dominions concerned, as soon as the latter passed the necessary courses of instruction or were considered otherwise qualified for the various appointments. It is suggested, therefore, that each self-governing Dominion should arrange as soon as possible to prepare and send a suitable number of officers to undergo a staff college course at Camberley, Quetta, or at the local staff colleges which it is hoped may soon be established.

CONCLUSION.

To sum up, the following seem the main points requiring attention at the present moment, in order to lay the foundation of an Imperial General Staff:—

- (i.) All the forces of the Empire to be organized for war on the same general principles, especially as regards the system of command and staff duties. For this purpose the formation of the Imperial General Staff should be proceeded with as far as the present available means permit.
- (ii.) Uniformity to be ensured in the system of training officers for the General Staff by arranging for—
 - (a.) Uniformity in the system of educating regimental officers from whom selections for the staff colleges are made. This is to be secured by recognizing the Staff College at Camberley as the central school of military education for the Empire, and by filling at the outset, to such extent as may be approved by the respective government of the oversea Dominions, the most important instructional appointments by Camberley graduates.
 - (b.) Uniformity in the system of selection of regimental officers for staff college courses.
 - (c.) Uniformity in the entrance examinations, curriculum, syllabus, and teaching at the several staff colleges.
- (iii.) Uniformity in the carrying out of staff duties, to be attained by encouraging graduates of the staff colleges, who aspire to holding the more important General Staff appointments, to undergo a further course of training in England or India; and by arranging for a systematic interchange of officers of the Imperial General Staff between the various appointments throughout the Empire.

The system proposed above could not be carried out without a certain expenditure of money. Amongst other items of cost it should be recognized that officers who are sent far from their homes for the benefit of the Empire ought not to suffer pecuniarily, otherwise we cannot be sure of obtaining the services of men of the right type. But the total cost of the system would be small in proportion to the interests at stake, and if it resulted in greatly increased efficiency—as it is believed it would do—the money would be wisely spent.

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It is fully recognized that the system proposed would not produce an ideal General Staff at once. To do so is a matter of years, which renders it all the more desirable that a beginning should be made at once.

As stated before, the Imperial General Staff must have the confidence of the whole of the forces of the Empire in order to exercise the required influence over their training and education in peace, and over the conduct of operations in war; and this confidence can only be gained by officers who are believed to be worthy of it, both by reason of natural qualifications and through the possession of superior knowledge and judgment.

Before such an Imperial General Staff as we require can be formed, therefore, its members must be fully and carefully trained, and the complete organization must be built up gradually and slowly as qualified officers become available. The value of continuity in our methods of action is thus of prime importance, and though the personnel of the Imperial General Staff may change year by year, the spirit in which it is conceived, and which animates all its members, must always remain the same, namely, loyalty to the Empire and to one another, at all times and in all places.

W. G. NICHOLSON,
Chief of the General Staff.

December 7, 1908.

APPENDIX.

THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF OFFICERS PREPARATORY TO
THEIR ADMISSION TO THE STAFF COLLEGE.

1. The need has been explained why officers should normally be required to pass through one of the staff colleges, before being employed on the General Staff in any capacity. But in order that officers may obtain the fullest advantages from such a course, it is necessary that their military education as regimental officers should have reached a sufficient standard before they enter the colleges. It is necessary, in providing officers with the means of reaching that standard, again to remember the need for instilling uniformity of thought on all questions of principle in the theory and practice of war.

2. The desirability of officers entering the permanent military service of their country, as regimental officers, with a certain standard of general education and with a uniform grounding in the rudiments of their profession, has been alluded to. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to enter into any details regarding this part of an officer's education, but it should form the foundation for his subsequent training, and it must always exercise a very important and universal influence on the *esprit d'armée*, and on the state of efficiency of every unit included in the military forces of the Empire. It is especially necessary to bear this fact in mind at a time when the expansion and reorganization of these forces is under consideration.

3. Such education for candidates for the home and Indian armies is provided for in the United Kingdom in our great public schools and universities, and in the Royal Military College at Sandhurst and the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. This system may not be perfect, but it has, generally speaking, fulfilled its purpose satisfactorily.

4. It is suggested that in the oversea Dominions a similar course should as far as possible be followed, and that their governments should be invited to consider the feasibility of instituting national educational establishments calculated to meet their own military requirements, and that, in estimating these, consideration should not be limited to their permanent forces only.

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5. The system of regimental education is, however, at the present moment the most urgent matter requiring attention, in order to bring the military knowledge of the officers, from whom those who are to form the General Staff must be selected, up to the standard required as a basis for a study of the higher art of war. Some progress in this direction has already been made, but much still requires to be done. In suggesting how this should best be proceeded with, it is necessary to remember that, in cases where a considerable expansion of the forces of a Dominion is contemplated, an increased number of efficient General Staff officers will eventually be required to supervise the training of units as well as the education of officers, and to meet the possible wastage of war.

6. The first difficulty seems to consist in the provision of competent instructors. The governments concerned can doubtless find some locally; but it is necessary to emphasize the fact that an important feature of any system of military education is that the instructors themselves should have had a uniform education in the principles of the military art.

7. Should it be desirable, it would be possible during the transition stage, to arrange for the special attachment to the Staff College at Camberley of a limited number of officers (say, two or three) from the forces of each of the oversea Dominions, for special training as instructors rather than as General Staff officers. This would, however, be merely a temporary expedient, and not altogether satisfactory. If the government concerned prefer it to borrowing from the home army, the details of the conditions of attachment must be dealt with in a separate paper.

8. After having prepared suitable officers for a higher military education, the next step should be to send them to a course at one of the staff colleges, into which their entry would be regulated by the provisions of paragraph 720, King's Regulations

W. G. N.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1907.

Subject No. 2 proposed for discussion by the Army Council.

POSSIBILITY OF ASSIMILATING WAR ORGANIZATION THROUGHOUT THE EMPIRE.

(Paper prepared by the General Staff.)

1. The object of war organization is to facilitate and simplify the difficult task of a commander in the field, so that he may be able to devote as much of his attention as possible to the practical problem of defeating the enemy.

2. A properly organized army is a fighting machine designed in peace to carry out, with the minimum of friction and the maximum of efficiency, the work for which it is intended in war. The more thoroughly it has been prepared in peace, the less attention need be paid to its design in war and the more time will its commander have to devote to its utilization.

3. There are many subjects connected with organization from the burden of which no commander in the field can free himself, however good the organization of his army may be; such subjects, for instance, as the relative position from day to day of the larger subdivisions of his command, the formation of advanced and rear guards, the distribution of his forces for battle and the retention of a portion of them in reserve.

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4. The management of these and similar subjects, combined with the attempt to keep himself constantly acquainted with the plans and movements of the enemy, are sufficient to try a commander in the field, as well as his staff, to the utmost of their capacity. It is therefore essential, by careful and well considered previous organization, to prevent his time being taken up by questions which might have been solved for him before the beginning of the campaign.

5. In order that the organization of an army may work smoothly it must be understood by those who form part of it, and in order that it may be understood by all it must be simple. Simplicity can only be achieved by a symmetrical subdivision of parts, and by each part being suited to the place it has to fill. Thus, if an army is divided, as in the case of the British organization, into divisions, each division should include the same number of infantry brigades, and be furnished with the same proportion of artillery and mounted men; each infantry brigade should consist of the same number of battalions, each field artillery brigade of the same number of batteries and each battery of the same number of guns.

6. In order to achieve simplicity it is, further, important that the nomenclature employed throughout the army should be uniform and logical; the number of terms employed should be as few as possible, and the same term should always be applied to the same definite portion of the organization. Thus it would be apt to lead to confusion if one brigade of infantry were to be composed of infantry 'regiments' and another of infantry 'battalions,' or if one brigade included a portion of artillery and administrative services while another was composed of infantry only.

7. Any sacrifice of uniformity in organization immediately adds to the difficulty of the calculations on which the successful conduct of a campaign depends; for instance, if certain units of a force were of a different composition from the others, special allowance would have to be made in working out the amount of room they would take up on the march and in battle. If the correspondence portions of an army varied in size and composition, elasticity would be sacrificed, for it would no longer be possible to employ, with equal advantage, whichever happened to be most conveniently placed for a particular task. When more than one organization is employed, orders become more difficult both to write and to understand owing to the greater variety of names that have to be used, while the officers responsible for issuing orders are obliged to keep an increased mass of detail constantly in their minds.

8. All departures from uniformity also lead to additional complications in the necessarily elaborate system of administration in the field; the quantities of ammunition and supplies vary with the numbers of men and animals for whom they have to be carried, and the composition of the various ammunition and supply columns has to be altered accordingly, while special arrangements have to be made at depôts on the lines of communication; this all means extra labour for the various administrative departments, which are, as a rule, already overworked. The difficulty is much intensified if any portion of the administrative services themselves have a different organization from the remainder, for then the officers of every department have to make themselves acquainted with and to deal with two different organizations at the same time; or else there have to be two separate sets of administrative departments in the field; either of these alternatives presents almost insurmountable difficulties. Considerable inconvenience was experienced in Natal, because the transport of the troops sent from India was organized on a different system from that of the troops sent from England.

9. The basis of all war organization is the composition of the various units which form part of an army; this composition is given, in the case of the British army, in a number of tables which are published annually in a volume known as War Establishments. After the number of men and animals and the amount of material in the various units have been decided, the next step in organization is to group them into larger bodies. This process is repeated, until the whole army is grouped into a small

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number of large formations, whose commanders are directly under the orders of the commander-in-chief in the field. During the process of deciding the composition and grouping of the units, a large number of questions have to be dealt with, of which the following may be taken as examples.

- (a.) The proper proportion of cavalry and guns to infantry, and the most efficient size of a unit of each.
- (b.) The best system for replenishing ammunition and for supplying food, forage, and other articles to the troops.
- (c.) The most effective arrangements for dealing with the sick and wounded, and for moving them to hospitale in rear.
- (d.) The minimum amount of transport which will carry the actual necessities of troops in the field without hampering their mobility.
- (e.) The number of rounds per gun and rifle, and the number of day's rations per man and horse, to be carried by the various columns.

10. These are all questions, of the nature referred to at the end of paragraph 4, with which the commander in the field ought not to have to deal, and it will readily be understood that if he had to do so, much of his time would necessarily be devoted to that object.

It will be remembered that, when Lord Roberts landed in South Africa at the beginning of 1900, owing to the heterogeneous nature of the force placed under his command, he had to spend more than a month of valuable time in evolving a new transport organization for the Army, before any further strategical measures could be undertaken.

To obviate this waste of valuable time and energy, it is essential that all troops placed under the command of a general in the field should be organized on a single system, and that that system should be one with which the commander is closely acquainted and on which the bulk at any rate of the army has been trained.

11. This principle has already been accepted in the case of the auxiliary forces in the United Kingdom; it has been decided to form them into a Territorial Force, which will have identically the same organization for war as the Regular Army. In the case of India, too, the subject has been taken up, and communications are now passing between the military authorities in the United Kingdom and in India, as to the possibility of further assimilating the organization for war of the two countries. Some progress has already been made by substituting the division of three brigades for the army-corps, as the leading feature in the war organization of the United Kingdom.

12. In view of the probability that the colonies will take an ever increasing part in future wars in which the welfare of the Empire is at stake, it has, for the same reasons, been thought advisable to submit, for the consideration of the Colonial Conference, the subject of the possibility of assimilating the war organization of the colonies more closely to that of the United Kingdom. Steps in that direction have already been taken in the case of some of the colonies; officers sent by them have, from time to time, studied the question, in consultation with officers of the General Staff in London, with a view to seeing how far it would be possible for them to adopt the war establishments already referred to.

13. Much, however, remains to be done before it can be said that the war organization is the same for the whole of the Empire; for instance, while in War Establishments the unit of infantry is the battalion, in Canada it is the regiment. The mounted unit varies considerably, both in name and strength, and the mounted branch is alternatively known as cavalry, mounted infantry, mounted rifles, light horse and carbineers. In War Establishments the unit of field artillery is the brigade which consists of three batteries and an ammunition column; in the case of some colonies the batteries are not grouped at all, while in others, where they are grouped, no arrangement exists for forming ammunition columns. The situation is similar as regards administrative units; in many cases no provision appears to have been made

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for them, while in cases where they do exist they vary in name and composition, *e. g.*, the medical field unit in War Establishments is the field ambulance; in Australia there are still two units, the field hospital and the bearer company, while the same is the case in New Zealand.

14. The following is a copy of pages 21 and 22 of War Establishments, 1907-08, and shows the general lines of the organization of the field army to be maintained in the United Kingdom for service abroad:—

COMPOSITION OF BRIGADES, DIVISIONS AND ARMY TROOPS.*

A.—*Composition of Cavalry Brigade.*

Headquarters.

3 cavalry regiments.

B.—*Composition of a Cavalry Division.*

Headquarters.

4 cavalry brigades.

Cavalry divisional troops—

Cavalry divisional artillery—

Headquarters.

2 horse artillery brigades.

Cavalry divisional engineers—

Headquarters.

4 field troops.

1 wireless telegraph company.

1 cavalry divisional transport and supply column.

4 cavalry field ambulances.

C.—*Composition of an Infantry Brigade.*

Headquarters.

4 infantry battalions.

D.—*Composition of a Division.*

Headquarters.

3 infantry brigades.

Divisional troops—

Divisional mounted troops—

2 mounted infantry companies.

Divisional artillery—

Headquarters.

3 field artillery brigades.

1 field artillery (howitzer) brigade.

1 heavy battery and ammunition column.

1 divisional ammunition column.

Divisional engineers—

Headquarters.

2 field companies.

1 divisional telegraph company.

1 divisional transport and supply column.

1 divisional transport and supply park.

3 field ambulances.

* A few minor alterations have been made in the composition of these formations since this paper was drawn up. The necessary corrections have been made below.—25th November, 1908.

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E.—Composition of a Mounted Brigade.

Headquarters.

1 cavalry regiment.

1 horse artillery battery and a mounted brigade ammunition column.

2 mounted infantry battalions.

1 mounted brigade transport and supply column.

1 cavalry field ambulance.

F.—Composition of the Army Troops for a Force of a Cavalry Division and 6 Divisions.

Army headquarters.

2 mounted brigades.

2 Imperial Yeomanry squadrons.

1 infantry battalion.

1 wireless telegraph company.

2 cable telegraph companies.

2 air-line telegraph companies.

3 balloon companies.

2 bridging trains.

1 army troops transport and supply column.

2 field ambulances.

In order more thoroughly to understand the organization in question, a study of the remainder of the book is necessary.

15. Coming now to practical proposals, it is submitted for the consideration of the conference that—

- (i.) The same military terms should be adopted throughout the Empire, especially as regards the names applied to similar bodies of troops, *e.g.*, 'cavalry regiment,' 'field company,' 'infantry battalion.'
- (ii.) Any unit which may be sent as part of a colonial contingent in war should be composed, as far as circumstances permit, of the numbers shown in War Establishments.
- (iii.) When a number of units are sent they should be grouped in the same manner as shown in War Establishments.
 - (a.) When mounted troops are sent they should, if possible, be organized as mounted brigades, but there would be no need to differentiate between cavalry and mounted infantry in the brigade, and all these units might with advantage be on the cavalry war establishment.
 - (b.) When dismounted men are sent, they should be organized into divisions, if sufficient in number; if not, into infantry brigades, with a due proportion of divisional troops.
- (iv.) Whatever the size of the contingent sent by a colony, it should be accompanied by the requisite number of administrative field units; these are necessary on the same scale as is provided for in War Establishments to meet its wants in the way of ammunition and supplies, and for attending to the sick and wounded. The administrative units held ready in the United Kingdom are only sufficient to deal with the requirements of the forces despatched from thence; consequently, unless units of this nature were sent with the colonial contingents, the fighting troops of one or the other force would have to go short.
- (v.) Administrative units on the lines of communication should be provided entirely by the United Kingdom.

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16. It may perhaps be asked why the war organization of the United Kingdom shall be adopted as the universal war organization of the Empire. The reason is that for many years to come the army despatched from the United Kingdom is likely to form the larger portion of the whole force engaged in any Imperial campaign, and that it is therefore simpler for the forces sent from the various colonies to conform to its organization than for it, and the forces from the remaining colonies to conform to that of any one colony. Further, the General Staff in London have facilities for the study of war organization which are not yet available in the case of any of the colonies. The war organization now being introduced has been worked out after the devotion of much attention to the question, and the careful study of the organization of the leading foreign armies. The work of the General Staff is proceeding continuously, and it is hoped that by this means constant improvement will be possible, and that the organization will advance concurrently with the progress of military science.

17. It may also be urged that, although the organization worked out by the General Staff may be that best suited for a great war, it may yet be unsuitable for the other duties for which the military forces of certain colonies are primarily intended. This is, of course, a question which must be weighed by the authorities of the colonies concerned, but the wisest principle to adopt in such cases is that any organization should be based upon the most important requirements which it is likely to have to meet; moreover, it will generally be possible so to adapt the organization that it can be made to serve more than one set of circumstances.

18. It is hoped that the representatives of the different colonies will use their influence on their return home to impress on their Governments the great additional strength which would accrue to the Empire should uniformity of war organization be achieved. The great services rendered in the past by the colonies show the value of any assistance which they are prepared to give in time of emergency, even without the advantages of a similar organization. In the future the value of such assistance would be still further increased if it could be given in a form which enables it to be at once fitted into its place in the organization of the army in the field. Every colony which sent a contingent to fight alongside the forces of the United Kingdom, and of other colonies, would then have the satisfaction of knowing that it was applying its aid in the manner in which it would be most effective and at the point where it was most required.

N. G. LYTTELTON,

C. G. S.

14th March, 1907.

From Lord Crewe to Lord Grey.

DOWNING STREET, January 15, 1909.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to forward, for the consideration of Your Excellency's minister, copies of a letter from the War Office, inclosing and commenting on a memorandum which has been prepared by the General Staff on the subject of the creation of an Imperial General Staff for the service of the Empire as a whole.

2. This memorandum has been prepared in pursuance of the third resolution of the Imperial Conference of 1907, and His Majesty's government trust that the principles and procedure explained in it may meet with the acceptance from your government, and I hope that it will be welcomed as showing the lines on which action should be taken in developing and improving the existing organization of the Defence Forces of the Dominion.

3. I shall be glad to receive the observations of your ministers as soon as possible and if they accept the principles of the memorandum, it will be convenient if I can be informed by telegram. I propose to lay this despatch and its inclosures before parliament, as the question has attracted much public attention in this country, and was regarded by the Conference of 1907 as one in the united discussion and solution of which the whole Empire is deeply interested.

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MEMORANDUM BY THE CANADIAN MINISTERS CONCERNING DEFENCE.

(Published as Appendix VI. of Papers relating to a Conference between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Prime Ministers of self-governing Colonies, 1902.)

The Canadian Ministers regret that they have been unable to assent to the suggestions made by Lord Shelborne respecting the Navy and by Mr. St. John Broderick respecting the Army. The Ministers desire to point out that their objections arise, not so much from the expense involved, as from a belief that the acceptance of the proposals would entail an important departure from the principle of colonial self-government. Canada values highly the measure of local independence which has been granted it from time to time by the Imperial authorities, and which has been so productive of beneficial results, both as respects the material progress of the country and the strengthening of the ties that bind it to the Motherland. But while, for these reasons, the Canadian Ministers are obliged to withhold their assent to the propositions of the Admiralty and the War Office, they fully appreciate the duty of the Dominion, as it advances in population and wealth, to make more liberal outlay for those necessary preparations of self-defence which every country has to assume and bear.

That the taxpayers of the United Kingdom should desire to be relieved of some of the burdens which they bear in connection with military expenditure is quite reasonable. Canada in the development of its own militia system will be found ready to respond to that desire by taking upon itself some of the services in the Dominion which have hitherto been borne by the Imperial government. What has already been done by Canada must give assurance of the disposition of the Canadian people to recognize their proper obligations.

In the early years of the Dominion an understanding was come to between the Imperial and Canadian governments that Canada should expend about \$1,000,000 annually on her militia system. From time to time that expenditure has been voluntarily increased, and at present, apart from the special outlay in connection with the maintenance of the garrison at Halifax, the Dominion is expending about \$2,000,000 annually on her militia.

The efficiency of the Canadian Militia Service having been called in question, it may be of interest to note that many improvements have been made during the past few years; notably the organization of an Army Medical Corps and the creation of an Army Service Corps, the strengthening of the headquarters and district staffs, the exercise of greater care in the selection of permanent force officers, and the affording of greater facilities for the training of the officers of the active militia.

A Militia Pension Law has been enacted for the staff and the permanent force. Annual drills in camps of instruction for the rural corps, and at battalion headquarters for city corps, has been carried out each year during the past six years. A school of musketry has been established at Ottawa, with most encouraging results; rifle-ranges have been and are being constructed at the public expense at important centres all over the Dominion, and financial aid is being afforded to local corps in smaller places for the same object. Rifle associations, whose members are pledged to military service if required, are being organized, and their formation encouraged by the loan of rifles and by grants of free ammunition. A reserve of officers has been established, and improvements have also been made in several other important respects.

The work done by the Militia Department in sending contingents to South Africa may be fairly cited as proof of reasonable efficiency. Without referring to anything which was done outside of the purely Canadian contingents, it is worthy of mention that the first contingent, under Colonel Otter, composed of 1,000 men drawn from every section of Canada embraced within 4,000 miles of territory lying between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, was organized, fully equipped, and embarked within a period of 14 days; and that a second contingent, composed of 1,200 men, composed

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of Field Artillery and Mounted Rifles, was shortly afterwards similarly organized, equipped and embarked within the space of three weeks.

But while thus calling attention to the progress that has already been made by Canada in her militia organization, the Ministers are far from claiming that perfection has been attained. If defects exist, there is every desire on the part of the Canadian Government to remove them, and for this purpose the advice and assistance of experienced Imperial officers will be welcomed and all reasonable efforts made to secure an efficient system.

At present Canadian expenditures for defence services are confined to the military side. The Canadian Government are prepared to consider the naval side of defence as well. On the seacoasts of Canada there is a large number of men admirably qualified to form a Naval Reserve, and it is hoped that at an early day a system may be devised which will lead to the training of these men and to the making of their services available for defence in time of need.

In conclusion, the Ministers repeat that, while the Canadian Government are obliged to dissent from the measures proposed, they fully appreciate the obligation of the Dominion to make expenditures for the purposes of defence in proportion to the increasing population and wealth of the country. They are willing that these expenditures shall be so directed as to relieve the taxpayer of the mother country from some of the burdens which she now bears; and they have the strongest desire to carry out their defence schemes in co-operation with the Imperial authorities, and under the advice of experienced Imperial officers, so far as this is consistent with the principle of local self-government, which has proved so great a factor in the promotion of Imperial unity.

LONDON, 11th August, 1902.

The Honourable

The Minister of Militia and Defence.

Certified copy of a report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General on the 10th February, 1909.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had under consideration a despatch, dated 15th January, 1909, from the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, forwarding a letter from the War Office, dated 15th December, 1908, inclosing and commending to the attention of Your Excellency's Government a memorandum prepared by the General Staff, on the subject of the creation of an Imperial General Staff for the service of the Empire as a whole.

The Minister of Militia and Defence, to whom the said despatch and inclosures were referred, submits a report thereon (hereunto attached) in which he expresses the opinion that Your Excellency's Government may safely assent to the general principles proposed for adoption in the memorandum by the General Staff, and recommends, that, as requested in the above quoted Colonial Office letter, a cable message conveying that assent be addressed to the Colonial Office.

The committee, concurring in the said report of the Minister of Militia and Defence, submit the following as the text of the cable message to be sent by Your Excellency to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies:—

‘Your despatch Canada 30 of January 15th. My Ministers fully accept the principles set forth in memorandum by General Staff. Despatch will follow explaining precise position of Dominion Government.’

The committee further advise that Your Excellency may be pleased to transmit a copy of this minute and of the annexed report to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

All which is respectfully submitted for approval.

F. K. BENNETTS,
Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council.
OTTAWA, February 9, 1909.

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To His Excellency

The Governor General in Council.

1. The undersigned has the honour to report, for the information of Your Excellency in Council, that he has had under his consideration Colonial Office letter (Canada No. 30), dated 15th January, 1909, in which the Secretary of State for the Colonies forwards a letter from the War Office, dated 15th December, 1908, inclosing and commending to the attention of Your Excellency's Government a memorandum prepared by the General Staff, on the subject of the creation of an Imperial General Staff for the service of the Empire as a whole.

2. The undersigned, after full and careful consideration of the important question referred to him, is of the opinion that Your Excellency's Government may safely assent to the general principles proposed for adoption in the memorandum by the General Staff, and recommends that, as requested in the above quoted Colonial Office letter, a cable message conveying that assent be addressed to the Colonial Office.

3. At the same time, he is of opinion that it is advisable that, simultaneously with a general acceptance of the principles laid down in the memorandum referred to, the position of Your Excellency's Government upon certain points therein which especially appear to require attention should be precisely defined, and he, therefore, recommends that the cable message in question should further state that a despatch explaining this position will follow by the first mail. He submits the following as the text of the message:—

'Your despatch Canada 30 of January 15th. My Ministers fully accept the principles set forth in memorandum by General Staff. Despatch will follow explaining precise position of Dominion government.'

4. With regard to the despatch itself, the Minister of Militia recommends that it should state, that Your Excellency's government is prepared to give full assent to the general principles laid down, both in the letter of the War Office and in the memorandum prepared by the General Staff, and they do it all the more cordially in that they observe that, in the body of the memorandum itself the great principle of complete local control, by the responsible Ministers concerned, of the officers of the local section of the Imperial General Staff is fully safeguarded.

5. It will probably be within Your Excellency's recollection that, in the 'Memorandum by the Canadian Ministers concerning Defence,' which was drawn up at the Colonial Conference of 1902, the reasons given for dissenting from certain of the proposals laid before that Conference by the War Office and the Admiralty were stated to be, that 'the acceptance of the proposals would entail an important departure from the principle of colonial self-government.' This important question appears to be adequately provided for in the latter portion of the penultimate paragraph of page 8 of the present memorandum, in which it is stated that 'the full control of the Chief of the local section of the General Staff by his own government must be accepted from the outset.' It is further clearly laid down that, while Chiefs of the local sections of the General Staff are to 'keep in close communication with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, they cannot receive orders from him. He will keep them informed as to what are considered, from an Imperial point of view, the correct general principles, and they will advise their governments as to the best method of applying these principles to local conditions and as to the risk of departing from them. When their advice is not accepted, it will be their duty to carry out whatever their respective governments may order.'

6. In regard to that portion of the paragraph quoted which states that 'the Chiefs of the local sections of the General Staff will keep in close communication with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff,' the undersigned is cordially in agreement with the proposal, but he is of opinion that, in order to avoid possible misunderstanding by the Chief of the Canadian section, of the views or intentions of the Dominion government, and consequent misrepresentation of those views to the Chief of the Im-

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perial General Staff, it would be advisable to lay down definitely that all communication passing between the Chief of the Canadian section and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, other than those on purely routine or ephemeral questions, must be submitted to the Minister of Militia for his concurrence before being despatched.

7. The Minister of Militia further feels it desirable that a definite assent should be given to the axiom (first paragraph of Part III., p. 9) that 'in order to qualify themselves for employment on the General Staff, officers must have been educated previously up to a certain common standard of military knowledge, and have become imbued with the requisite uniformity of thought and practice.

'This uniformity in training and thought can only be obtained by passing officers intended for General Staff work through a Staff College.'

8. The memorandum appears to contemplate the possibility of the Staff College at Camberley (England) which must, for some years to come, be the central school of higher military education for the whole Empire, becoming congested, should large numbers of officers from overseas be collected together there, and suggests, as a possible remedy, decentralization by the establishment of similar colleges in the oversea Dominions.'

9. The Minister of Militia holds the opinion that, in view of the improbability of any large increase of the Canadian Permanent Forces for some years to come, it is unlikely that the Dominion would, for a considerable period, be able to spare more than four officers of that force at any one time for a Staff College training. If this be so, then it would not be worth while for the Dominion to establish a Staff College of its own, and it would be preferable, subject to War Office concurrence, to continue to send these officers to the Staff College, Camberley, following the existing arrangement. Should this course entail on the War Office any addition, either to the accommodation at the College or to the number of the instructors, the Dominion government would, of course, be prepared to bear its share of the expense, calculated upon any equitable basis.

10. Closely allied with this part of the subject is the question, also considered in the memorandum, of the preliminary military education of regimental officers, in order to ensure that officers entering the Staff Colleges should have attained as uniform a standard of military knowledge as possible, so that they may profit to the utmost by the instruction given at those colleges. This question in Canada may present minor difficulties, to some extent adumbrated in the memorandum. In the opinion of the Minister, these may best be met by an extension of the functions of the Royal Military College, Kingston, and by including among its instructing staff specially selected officers from the educational branch of the Imperial General Staff.

11. Finally, the memorandum lays stress upon the advantages to be gained by the free interchange of officers between the various branches of the Imperial General Staff in the different parts of the Empire, and especially upon the great benefit which would result from periodical conferences of the Imperial General Staff, attended by representatives from all parts of the Empire, and held under the presidency of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London. The advantages indeed are obvious.

The acceptance of those proposals and those others already referred to would, doubtless, involve expenditure, but the resultant benefits are, in the Minister's opinion, so great as to outweigh enormously the comparatively small expense involved.

12. The following extract from the 'Memorandum by the Canadian Ministers concerning Defence,' of August, 1902, already referred to, states fully the policy which then commended itself, not only to the Government of Canada, but to the Dominion at large. In conclusion, the Ministers repeat that, while the Canadian Government are obliged to dissent from the measures proposed (in 1902), they fully appreciate the obligation of the Dominion to make expenditures for the purposes of defence in proportion to the increasing population and wealth of the country. They are willing that these expenditures should be so directed as to relieve the taxpayer of the Mother

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Country of some of the burdens which he now bears; and they have the strongest desire to carry out their defence schemes in co-operation with the Imperial authorities and under the advice of experienced Imperial officers, so far as this is consistent with the principle of local self-government which has proved so great a factor in the promotion of Imperial unity.'

This extract from a memorandum written six years ago would appear to represent correctly the attitude of Your Excellency's Government at the present time.

F. W. BORDEN,
Minister of Militia and Defence.

